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I. Introduction 
It has been increasingly recognized that entrepreneurship holds the key to 
industrial development in developing countries (World Bank 2012). Indeed, a 
significant number of studies find that productivity and profitability vary greatly across 
enterprises even in the same industry in the same country, and that a large part of the 
variation can be accounted for by the difference in management practices1  In the past, 
foreign aid and government policies have not paid enough attention to the critical role 
played by entrepreneurship (e.g., Sievers and Vandenberg 2007). Identifying and 
supporting high-potential entrepreneurs may be the key to the success of industrial 
development. 
Entrepreneurship is the capacity to introduce new ideas into practice and to 
manage enterprise operations efficiently. Innovation here does not necessarily mean 
scientific discovery or engineering invention but the Schumpeterian creation of a new 
combination of production resources and new ideas to increase profits.   In the context 
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 See, for example, Bloom and van Reenen (2007, 2010), Bloom, Eifert et al. (2011), Bloom, 
Mahajan et al. (2010), Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2010), and Syverson (2011). 
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of developing economies, innovation includes borrowing technology or learning from 
abroad. The first introduction of products and production processes from developed 
countries into a developing country and the first adoption of management practices that 
may be common in developed countries but are novel in developing countries are 
considered to be innovations.   
Despite its importance, we know little about the entrepreneurship of business 
owners and managers in developing countries. 2   Why are firms there less able to 
innovate and manage than their counterparts in developed countries?  How can their 
entrepreneurship be nurtured?  The purpose of this paper is to explore these questions 
by reviewing our case studies of industrial clusters in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA).  These studies include randomized controlled trials of management training.  We 
highlight cluster-based industrial development because low-income countries should 
have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing industries, which are 
characterized by the dominance of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) located in 
industrial clusters.3  In other words, we are interested in cultivating entrepreneurship 
that will foster cluster-based MSE development since such development will be 
conducive to reducing poverty and income equality and crucial for inclusive growth.4  
In Asia and Latin America, there are a large number of industrial clusters.5  Clusters are 
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 In this paper, we refer to owners or other ultimate decision makers of enterprises as business 
owners and managers to avoid confusion between entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship.  The term 
entrepreneur is used to denote owners and managers with varying entrepreneurial skills. 
3
 We define an industrial cluster simply as the localization of firms producing similar and related 
products (e.g., final products and parts).   
4
 Our approach is consistent with the theoretical proposition of Rodriguez-Clare (2007) that the best 
industrial policy entails the direct promotion of industrial clusters in the sector in which the country 
has a comparative advantage. 
5
 As reported by Huang and Bocchi (2008), Long and Zhang (2011), Sonobe and Otsuka (2006), and 
Schmitz and Nadvi (1999). 
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not uncommon in SSA6  
Our basic premise is that learning from abroad, as well as adopting and spreading 
technology are essential elements of industrial development.  It's easy to assume that 
technology transfers will be automatically achieved once a developing country succeeds 
in attracting foreign direct investments (FDIs), but according to the economics literature, 
that is often not the case. FDI will have little impact on the development of local 
indigenous industries if local businesses have little capacity to learn from abroad, to 
assimilate and adopt borrowed technologies.   This is why this paper discusses 
managerial and innovation capacities, and the role of training in improving these 
capacities. 
Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) find that a number of industrial clusters in 
Latin America are “survival clusters” producing generally low-quality products and 
selling them predominantly to domestic markets.  Yoshino (2011) finds that most 
industrial clusters in SSA are also survival clusters, where firms are barely breaking 
even.  Why do these firms fail to innovate?  Possibly because of unfavorable business 
environments: such as bad governance, poor infrastructure, and inadequate financing.  
Or, they may not possess much entrepreneurship.  The former is important but, we 
believe the latter is crucial. There are cases in which clusters have successfully grown 
despite unfavorable business climates.  This paper explores how that happens. We begin 
by asking how business owners and managers who are not entrepreneurs dare to start 
their businesses.   
To answer this question, Section II describes how cluster-based MSEs in various 
industries developed in different countries in Asia and Africa.  We find that many 
                                                          
 
4 
 
owners and managers come to feel keenly their lack of managerial and innovative 
capacities, as their clusters become survival clusters.   Section III begins by discussing 
the possible reasons why they cannot improve these skills and what government and 
foreign aid can do to support training, awareness campaigns, and other efforts to nurture 
entrepreneurship.   We then review the results of management training experiments, 
including our own, to see whether entrepreneurship can be taught and how management 
training programs can be improved in future.  Section IV contains concluding remarks. 
 
II. Managerial and Innovative Capacities of MSEs 
 
In this section, we use the results of our observational studies to discuss why 
managerial and innovative capacities are not important initially but assume importance 
later in the process of industrial development.   
Our arguments in this paper are based mainly on our 19 case studies of cluster-
based industrial development in Asia and Africa, which are listed in Table 1.  Of these 
case studies, 8 cases (cases 6, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 19) involved experiments, of 
which 5 experiments (cases 6, 10, 14, 16, and 19) were randomized controlled trials. 
Discussion of the results of these experiments is deferred to the next section.  
 
Selection of the Cases 
We conducted the 19 case studies over nearly 15 years without a long-run study 
plan specifying which industrial clusters should be studied based on random selection 
from a list of clusters.  This is because there was and is no such a list.  The number of 
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clusters is unknown, especially in SSA.  It is likely that SSA has many more clusters 
and entrepreneurs than governments and researchers recognize.  Most would be survival 
clusters.7  The 19 clusters that we studied are not representative of industrial clusters in 
Asia and Africa, and they are more likely to be focused on dynamically growing rather 
than survival clusters.  Nonetheless, they cover a variety of MSE clusters in Asia and 
Africa.   
All these clusters have been voluntarily and spontaneously formed by private 
firms without much assistance from the government, including the four cases in China. 
Thus, the China case studies are comparable to the others.  The studies of four industrial 
clusters in Japan and Taiwan, China are also comparable because they were developed 
before these countries became highly industrialized.  Table 2 reports the major 
characteristics of these clusters in terms of the number of firms, average employment 
size of firms, average schooling years of entrepreneurs, and whether their products were 
exported.  The industrial clusters in SSA (cases 8-10, 15-17, and 19) can be as large as 
their Asian counterparts in terms of the number of firms within a cluster, but the firms’ 
employment sizes tend to be smaller in SSA.  
The clusters in the first group (i.e., cases 1 to 10) were initiated by pioneering 
businesses that produced imitations of imported goods without any help from the 
government or foreign firms.  The development of the second group of clusters (cases 
11 to 17) was based on foreign technologies brought in by foreign direct investments 
(FDIs), state-owned firms (SOEs), or foreign artisans who migrated from Southern 
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 We have found that the number of business people operating in our study sites in SSA has not been 
captured by statistical and tax authorities.  We have also found a few clusters in SSA that were not 
known to researchers.   
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Europe and ran home-based businesses.8  In the third group (cases 18 and 19), the 
clusters came into existence thanks to training programs provided by foreign firms and 
international organizations. Consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, the initial 
products of these clusters, as shown in the parentheses in the last column, tended to be 
labor-intensive items. This tendency is clearer in the first group than in the second and 
third groups (cases 18 and 19).  
Indeed in the first group, new industries emerged as main products or activities 
shifted to take advantage of existing institutions, infrastructures, and technologies.9  In 
Kumasi, Ghana (case 10), for example, metalworking firms, such as lathe turners, 
welders, and casting foundries, are clustered where thousands of car repair garages are 
concentrated. These garages need a lot of metal processing services and also provide an 
abundant supply of scrap metal from disabled cars that cannot be repaired. The 
metalworking firms provide repair services but also manufacture a variety of metal 
products, such as corn mill machines, wheelbarrows, and cash safes. Among tailors in 
Addis Ababa and Nairobi (cases 8 and 9), those who made money and won the buyers’ 
trust expanded their businesses from tailoring into the factory or workshop production 
of ready-made garments. In cases 1, 4, 5, 7, 13, and 15, a number of owners and 
managers started as traders and then diversified their businesses into manufacturing. 
Such former traders tend to be high-performers, which may reflect the importance of 
management and marketing skills to manufacturing firms in developing countries.  
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 Although printed circuit boards (PCBs) are core devices for electronics items and IT equipment, the 
PCBs produced in the clusters listed in Table 1 in their early days were technologically simple and 
produced without using expensive machinery. 
9 This is consistent with the observation of Hidalao et al. (2007) that countries move through the 
product space by developing new goods similar to those they currently produce. 
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Bangladesh vs. Ethiopia 
Firms in survival clusters perform poorly not only because the business 
environment is unfavorable but also because their own managerial and innovative 
capacities are inadequate.  To see this, compare the garment industries in Bangladesh 
(case 18 in Tables 1 and 2) and Ethiopia (case 8).10 Both are least developed countries 
and regarded as relatively corrupt.11 Both attempted to develop their export-oriented 
garment industries from scratch, but with contrasting outcomes.  In Bangladesh, the 
garment industry now has more than 5,000 manufacturing firms, employs roughly four 
million workers directly, and ranks among the world’s largest producers of garment 
items as is shown in Figure 1 (Mottaleb and Sonobe 2012).  In Ethiopia, the garment 
industry’s export performance has been very poor despite strong government support. 
The export-oriented garment production in Bangladesh dates from 1979, when a 
newly established firm, Desh, entered a technical cooperation agreement with the then 
leading garment exporter, Daewoo, in Korea (Rhee 1990; Easterly 2002).  These firms 
teamed up because both were sure that the creation of a cadre of professionals would 
allow the latent comparative advantage of Bangladesh in garment production to 
materialize. The agreement sent 130 young employees of Desh, who were university 
graduates, to Korea for intensive training for eight months in production skills, 
management skills, and international procurement and marketing at Daewoo’s factory. 
The garment industry in Bangladesh has since continued to grow rapidly over three 
decades with the continual learning of technology and management from abroad.  
By contrast, the government of Ethiopia attached only secondary importance to 
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 See Sonobe and Otsuka (2011, chapters 8 and 9) for details. 
11
 In terms of corruption, probably Bangladesh was worse, being ranked the most corrupt country in 
the world from 2001 to 2005, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index, which is available at 
<http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi> 
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learning from abroad and entrepreneurship when it began promoting export-oriented 
garment production in the mid-2000s. The promotion policy offered various preferential 
incentives including the provision of land in industrial zones and finance to export-
oriented firms. The managers hired by these firms were highly educated but had no 
experience in operating a garment business in the international market. Despite their 
preferential treatment, these firms have performed more poorly than the ready-made 
garment producers catering to the domestic market.12 
This comparison provides us with several lessons. First, a labor-abundant country 
does not necessarily have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive garment 
production. This is because while the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem assumes equal access to 
the same technology, comparative advantage is determined by productivity as well as 
factor endowments.  Second, a major determinant of productivity is technical and 
managerial expertise, and the best way to acquire such expertise is to learn from abroad. 
This is true not only in the Bangladesh case but also in cases 11 to 17 and 19, all of 
which are relatively successful. Third, compared with the paramount importance of 
learning from abroad as a determinant of productivity, financing is a secondary issue.  
In all the cases listed in Table 1, apart from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the 
township-and-village-run enterprises (TVREs) in China13, the firms were founded with 
the owners' funds or by borrowing from relatives and friends. There is much evidence 
that credit markets in developing countries are not working well.14 However, that so 
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 After a few years, many of the export-oriented firms received only trial orders but were unable to 
receive real orders, and their labor productivity was not significantly different from that of poorly 
equipped tailors and much lower than that of the best-performing factories producing ready-made 
garments for the domestic market. 
13
 In the case of private firms in China, the main sources of start-up funds are own funds and 
borrowing from relative and friends (Allen et al. 2005). 
14
 See, for example, Beck et al. (2009) and Karlan and Morduch (2009). 
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many industrial clusters were successfully established without using formal credits 
indicates that unfavorable access to finance is not the main constraint on the 
development of industries in their initiation stage when firm sizes are small.15 
Fourth, managers and workers in the garment industry in Bangladesh know that 
returns to human capital investment are high.  This is partly because they have the 
experience of investing in their human capital and partly because the demand for skilled 
workers and knowledgeable and experienced managers increases as new firms are 
established. They are keen to learn, and their human capital investment drives the 
industry’s growth, which in turn maintains the high returns to human capital. Fifth, this 
virtuous circle was initiated by the success of the Desh-Daewoo training program, 
which boosted the profitability of export-oriented garment production in Bangladesh. 
The increased profitability attracted investment in new factories by wealthy Bangladeshi 
families and foreign firms, offering worthwhile jobs to educated youth. As a result, the 
garment firms in Bangladesh were relatively large from the beginning and thousands of 
them grew to be larger (see Figure 1). This is prima facie evidence that training and 
experience can nurture entrepreneurs.  
Sixth, and finally, replicating the Desh-Daewoo training program is difficult 
because firms are reluctant to shoulder the cost of general training (Becker 1962).16 In 
Bangladesh, no other training program comparable to the Desh-Daewoo program in 
terms of the scale and quality has ever been offered by foreign or domestic firms. The 
governments of low-income countries are advised to seek learning opportunities. 
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 Long and Zhang (2011) find that firms provide trade credit actively to each other in industrial 
clusters in China, which lessens the credit constraints.  Ruan and Zhang (2009) find that firm size in 
industrial clusters in China is small due to the division and specialization of labor among firms, so 
that entry barriers are reduced. 
16
 Desh canceled the contract with Daewoo after the training was completed, and the vast majority of 
the 130 trainees soon left Desh to join new factories as managers or to start their own trading houses. 
10 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investments 
Learning from abroad is a core element of industrial development.  Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is a major channel of learning from abroad.  It does not follow, 
however, that FDI is always an effective policy for industrial development.   Whether 
low-income countries can attract FDIs depends on the business environment. This is 
affected by a variety of factors, including the quality of human resources, governance, 
business laws and regulations, the availability of auxiliary and supporting services 
including the supply of intermediate inputs, and infrastructure.  The quality of these 
factors becomes satisfactory only after industries are considerably developed.  
Furthermore, foreign firms may not invest in subsidiaries in low-income countries if 
they anticipate that their products, production methods, and marketing channels are 
likely to be copied by native workers and their customers are likely to be stolen as in 
cases 11, 12, and 17.  
While there is a substantial body of literature on the spillover effects of FDIs on 
local industries, the results of empirical studies are mixed.  According to Blomström 
and Kokko (2003) among others, the potential spillover benefits are realized only if 
local firms have the ability and motivation to invest in absorbing foreign technology and 
skills. All these considerations point to the difficulty that low-income countries face in 
attracting FDIs and learning from them. While we do not deny the importance of 
attracting FDIs, we believe that it is risky for low-income countries to rely on FDIs 
alone as the main source of new knowledge for initiating a new industry. 
 
Why Business owners and managers who are not Entrepreneurs Set up Firms 
11 
 
While new industries in developed countries begin with invention of new 
products (Gort and Klepper 1982; Klepper 1996), new indigenous industries in 
developing countries begin with the imitation of imported products.  In cases 1 to 10 in 
Table 1, an industry pioneer exerted great efforts to find new production methods, 
sources of materials, and marketing channels for imperfect imitations of imported 
products.  Once these difficulties were overcome, the pioneer made sizable profits, 
despite the low quality of his or her products, because poor domestic consumers created 
a high demand for cheap substitutes of imported products and because competitors were 
few.  This profit attracted a swarm of imitators to the industry.  Many were spin-offs, 
i.e., the former employees of the pioneer, who produced the same low-quality products 
by using the same low-quality inputs and sold their products on the same local markets 
as the pioneer. In this way, an industrial cluster was formed, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Industries that began with technology brought by FDIs, SOEs, and international 
organizations followed almost the same path (cases 11 to 17 and 19).   
Earning high profits for the time being, owners and managers in the early phase 
are not particularly interested in introducing new products or new production processes.  
Moreover, they are rarely capable of innovation.  The pioneers are imitators, even 
though they are innovative in starting new business activities by imitating.  Other firms 
in the cluster are imitators of imitators and even less likely to possess innovative 
capacity.  Interestingly, setting up a firm in the cluster becomes increasingly easy over 
time for such entrepreneurs in the early phase of cluster development.  As the cluster 
expands in terms of the number of firms and hence their output, an increasing number of 
traders buying products and supplying materials come to the cluster, which makes 
production and transactions in the cluster more convenient.  Some firms specialize in 
12 
 
the production of parts. In other words, the division of labor between assemblers and 
part-suppliers and between manufacturers and traders increases with the market size 
(Stigler 1951; Ruan and Zhang 2009).  The problem of imperfect contract enforcement 
and asymmetric information is reduced in the industrial cluster by the “community 
mechanism” an environment where people know each other and spread information 
regarding unscrupulous behavior, as in rural communities (Hayami 2009; Arif and 
Sonobe 2012).17   
The number of firms and the total output in the cluster increase over time, but 
productivity and product quality are hardly improved.  This phase of cluster 
development may be termed the “quantity expansion” phase.  In clusters in their 
quantity expansion phase, even casual observers can see that very poorly managed firms 
are not forced to exit.  Possible reasons include the low-level of competition within the 
cluster, the high demand for low-quality products, and the availability of low-wage 
labor.  Thus, spontaneously formed and quantitatively expanded industrial clusters 
abound in firms with very limited managerial and innovative capacities.  Since such 
firms make positive profits, more of the same kinds of firms are attracted to the cluster.   
They, however, will face difficulty in the next phase. 
 
Increasing Importance of Managerial and Innovative Capacities 
As the cluster expands quantitatively, the product price and profitability will 
eventually decline because increased output is supplied to the limited domestic market 
for the cluster’s low-quality product.  This process, illustrated by Figure 2, took place in 
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 Hayami (e.g., 2009) argues that the community mechanism is effective not only for the 
enforcement of contract-based transactions but also for the management of local commons and the 
provision of local public goods in rural communities.  In this paper, however, we focus on the 
enforcement of contract-based transactions. 
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the subsequent quantity expansion phase of industrial development in all cases except 
for case 18 listed in Table 1.  As the profitability declines, the entry of new firms slows 
down and eventually ceases.   
Declining profitability will induce business owners and managers to seek more 
profitable products (Aghion et al. 2005), which should be of higher quality and 
differentiated from the inferior products of other firms.  Such endeavor, however, do not 
necessarily bear fruit. While a firm may successfully improve product quality by using 
high-quality materials and parts and by employing skilled workers, consumers may not 
immediately perceive the improved quality and the new product may fail to command a 
high price in market. As Akerlof (1970) points out, branding and quality guarantees 
would be effective countermeasures to this problem, but they may be known by only a 
few owners and managers, if any, in industrial clusters.  Moreover, since brands may be 
stolen, branding may have to be supplemented with the use of exclusive sales agencies 
and other distribution methods (Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka 2004).  Since the improved 
products contain differentiated parts and components, and since such intermediate 
goods embody new ideas, it is also important to establish trust-based, long-term 
subcontracting relationships with parts suppliers. In addition, to enter the high-quality 
segment of the market, product quality must be strictly controlled. If these reforms are 
successfully implemented, production can be expanded profitably.  
As the firm size is enlarged accordingly, the management of cash flows, inventory, 
and labor will assume greater importance. Good management is not an easy task for 
owners and managers in the cluster, as they have operated only small organizations and 
may be unaware of how to improve management.  In this sense, they are not likely to be 
efficient managers. They now need to study management or hire competent managers or 
14 
 
probably both. 
The restoration of high profitability involves these multidimensional 
improvements in production and management.  If one dimension of the improvements is 
missing, other improvements may not produce positive results.  For example, even a 
firm that has successfully launched a popular product may suffer from losses if its 
supply chain is inadequate.   Moreover, even a firm making profits may go into 
bankruptcy if its cash management is poor.  If a firm's attempt to improve production 
and management miscarries, the news will spread quickly in the cluster, and others may 
recoil from any new attempt at similar improvements. This will lead the cluster to a 
long-run stalemate in which profitability is so low that existing firms struggle for 
survival and there are no new entrants (see the dotted curves in Figure 2).  Most 
industrial clusters in SSA have been trapped in this equilibrium.  A possible exception is 
the leather shoes industry (case 15) in Addis Ababa, which seems to be going through 
multidimensional improvements in production and management by incorporating 
production and management knowledge from Italy.   
Many clusters in Asia, including cases 1 to 5 and 11 to 14, succeeded in 
multidimensional improvements and followed a development path leading to the 
dramatic growth of the industry with a smaller number of much larger firms, as 
illustrated by the solid curves in Figure 2.  Such a dynamic development phase may be 
termed the “quality-improvement” phase, in which managerial human capital plays a 
decisive role.  The growth of the industry in this phase entails creative destruction.  An 
increasing number of firms attempt to imitate the multidimensional improvements in the 
cluster, and some of them further improve production and management practices.  
Those firms undertaking continual improvements in production and management will 
15 
 
grow, whereas firms that fail to keep pace will be forced to exit the industry or will be 
merged with growing firms.  While the number of firms in the cluster will decrease as 
the result, the total production value and employment of the cluster will continue to 
grow, and the products will be sold in larger markets, including export markets.  
Continual improvements in production and management will be achieved by 
learning from outside of the cluster, especially from abroad. More concretely, 
innovative entrepreneurs acquire new knowledge of technology and management by 
visiting foreign countries frequently to participate in trade fairs and training programs. 
They also send workers abroad for training, and invite in foreign experts. They may also 
be able to learn from foreign firms operating within their countries. Entrepreneurs in 
Asia have been keen on learning from the successful experiences of advanced firms in 
neighboring countries. Taiwan and Korea learned from Japan, while China learned from 
Taiwan and Korea as well as from Japan. At present, South Asian countries are learning 
from China, among other countries.  In SSA, only a few owners and managers seem to 
clearly recognize the importance of learning from abroad.18 
 
Employment Size of Industrial Clusters 
To illustrate how significant industrial clusters are in terms of job creation and 
how they differ in size, with and without successful multi-dimensional improvements in 
production and management, Table 3 shows the number of manufacturing jobs and the 
total number of jobs (including those in garages in case 10 and subcontractors in case 
14). It also shows the gender and schooling composition of workers in the selected 
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 Some enterprise managers in East African countries, however, are learning from other countries by 
employing technicians and managerial advisers from Asia and by visiting European countries. 
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industrial clusters. Because we often failed to collect the relevant job data in case 
studies conducted earlier, we focus on recently surveyed industrial clusters.  Except for 
cases 10, 14, 15, and 18, the clusters listed in this table are in the final stage of the 
quantity expansion phase, and their total employment size ranges from 600 to thirteen 
thousand and has been relatively stable for the last several years. The metalwork cluster 
in Ghana (case 10) was expanding in terms of the number of enterprises at the time of 
our baseline survey in 2003. However according to the results of our follow-up surveys 
it probably has been in the final stage of the quantity expansion phase since 2005. The 
number of jobs is significantly higher in the knitwear cluster in Vietnam (case 14) and 
leather shoe cluster in Ethiopia (case 15), which have entered the quality improvement 
phase by newly introducing multidimensional improvements (Sonobe and Otsuka 2011).    
 
III. Trying to Make Management Training More Effective 
In recent years, an increasing number of randomized controlled experiments have 
been carried out to test the effectiveness of management training and consulting services 
provided to MSEs in various parts of the developing world. 19  A common finding 
obtained by these studies, including our own randomized experiments (cases 6, 10, 14, 
16, and 19) and as non-randomized ones (cases 8, 15, and 17), is that the owners and 
managers of MSEs had very limited management knowledge before receiving 
management training or consulting service.  While the training contents were rather 
rudimentary in many of these experiments, many participants in the training programs 
adopted the management practices taught in their program.  This indicates they had not 
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 See, for example, Karlan and Valdivia (2011), Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2010), Bruhn, Karlan, 
and Schoar (2010), Field, Jayachandran, and Pande (2010), Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010), and 
Mano et al. (2012). 
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been aware of those management practices before.   
 
Reasons for and Countermeasures to Low Awareness 
Most likely, the majority of the MSEs in the samples of these studies operate in 
survival clusters, and they know they need something new in order to increase 
profitability. Why then are these owners and managers ignorant of even basic 
management practices?    
There are two possible explanations. One attributes this ignorance to market 
failures. One market failure occurs because owners and managers do not know who 
possesses the knowledge they want to acquire, and when they do know, they are not 
able to verify whether or not the person has passed that knowledge to them.  Moreover, 
once the seller shares his or her knowledge, the buyers may quickly grasp and become 
unwilling to pay for it.  Because of this asymmetric information problem, the 
transaction of knowledge is difficult unless the seller has established a good reputation.  
The second type of relevant market failure arises from the difficulty in keeping the 
purchased knowledge secret.  If imitation or spillover is expected to be widespread, 
businesses will be reluctant to pay, preferring to get a free ride.  
The second explanation may be down to ignorance.  MSE owners and managers 
may value of learning as well as overestimating their own abilities.20  Many owners and 
managers in our study sites maintain their management is better than average. When 
asked how they know what the average is, they simply smile.   Moreover, some owners 
and managers may have a tendency to put off paying for expensive activities such as 
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 In the panel of Forbes 500 CEOs, Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that overconfident CEOs 
overestimate investment returns.   
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learning and investing.21 
The asymmetric information problem may be mitigated if management-training 
programs are provided by organizations with good reputations, such as governmental or 
international organizations, foreign aid agencies, well-known companies and NGOs.  
The gap between the social and private benefits of owners and managers’ acquiring 
management skills may be bridged by government’s support for management training or 
the provision of financial incentives to either owners or managers who learn 
management skills or to organizations that train them.22  Public awareness campaigns 
may help address ignorance about the value of management skills.   Owners and 
managers who tend to procrastinate may be nudged into action if microfinance or some 
other favorable treatment is linked with participation in a training program. 23  
Implementing these programs to assist MSEs is unlikely to lead to serious corruption, 
compared with infrastructure projects (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  
 
Estimating the Benefits of Management Training 
The above arguments about countermeasures are based on the premise that it is 
possible to design and implement a management-training program with social benefits 
exceeding costs.  There has, so far, been little empirical evidence that clearly supports 
this premise because the social benefits of management training programs are not easy 
to estimate even if sample owners and managers are randomly assigned to control and 
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 There is growing literature on procrastination (e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Andersen et al. 
2008).  A number of randomized controlled trials have confirmed the existence of procrastination. 
22
 Reviewing various policy options to facilitate industrialization in SSA, Page (2011) concludes that 
strengthening the managerial capabilities of firms and facilitating clustering are key policy measures.  
23
 There are already a number of management or business training programs linked with 
microfinance provision, including the training programs discussed by Karlan and Valdivia (2011) 
and Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010). 
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treatment groups.  Few studies have attempted cost-benefit analyses of management 
training.  Many papers on management experiments do not even mention costs.   
There are probably two major difficulties in measuring or estimating the social 
benefits of management training.24   One arises from the possible external effects of the 
training.  The social benefit is the sum of private benefits to the participants and those to 
non-participants, minus any harmful effects, if any.  Non-participants may benefit from 
the training program through knowledge spillovers. However, if participants increase 
sales revenues by taking customers from non-participants, someone will lose.  Few 
attempts have been made to measure or estimate these positive and negative 
externalities. 25  
A two-stage randomized design similar to the one used by Miguel and Kremer 
(2004) in estimating the external effects of education and health could be used. Because 
most MSEs are clustered, it is difficult to find owners and managers in remote places 
who are unaffected by what happens at the training site, especially if the researcher 
wants to control industry sectors.  If external effects exist, and if they are not controlled 
for, the estimation of the training effects is biased downward because the stable unit 
treatment value assumption (SUTVA, Rubin 1978) is violated.  Most of the existing 
studies simply assume that there are no externalities and attempt to estimate the private 
benefit of the training program to the participants. 
The second major difficulty in estimating the effects of training is that no one 
knows how long they take to become fully effective or how long they last. Existing 
studies measure how training programs change participants’ knowledge levels, their 
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 For a more comprehensive and rigorous discussion of the technical problems of the management 
experiments, see an excellent literature survey by McKenzie and Woodruff (2012). 
25
 An exception is a new study by Calderon et al. (2012). 
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adoption of management practices taught in the program, their longevity or survival in 
the market, and their accounting-based indicators of business performance, such as 
revenues, value added, and profits.   Most of the studies find that the training effects on 
the participants’ level of management skills and adoption of useful management 
practices are positive and statistically significant.  Mano et al. (2012) find that 
management training improves a participant business's longevity significantly.  
However, the training effects on accounting-based performance indicators are 
significant in only a small number of studies.  Presumably, this is partly because 
business performance is affected by a multitude of factors beyond the participants’ 
control, and partly because the training effect on business performance takes a longer 
time to make its full impact. It is likely this effect was measured too early in most 
studies.  
   
Tentative Results of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Since 2007 and in collaboration with the World Bank and the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), we have been conducting pilot projects in eight clusters 
where management training programs are provided for small businesses free of charge.. 
Cases 6, 10, 14, 16, and 19 can be regarded as randomized controlled experiments 
because owners and managers were assigned to treatment and control groups at random. 
Three cases (8, 15, and 17) are not randomized controlled experiments  
In each cluster, local business consultants provided management training in local 
languages in a classroom setting. An interpreter accompanied any international 
consultants.  In the clusters in Vietnam (cases 6 and 14), Ethiopia (case 16), and 
Tanzania (case 19), we also offered on-site training several months after the classroom 
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training was completed.  In the on-site training program, instructors visited participants’ 
firms to teach them how to adopt useful management practices. They later visited the 
firms again to check if the assimilation was going well and to give further advice.  The 
assignment to the on-site training was random and independent of the random 
assignment to the classroom training.  
To measure management practices, we use a simpler version of the management 
score developed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010) for medium-sized firms in 
developed and emerging economies.  Our version is suitable to MSEs in low-income 
countries. More than half of the elements of our management score are based on visual 
inspection by our enumerators. They base the remainder on the interviews with the 
owners or managers of the firm.   In each experiment, we observed the management 
score and the accounting-based performance indicators of each owner or manager in the 
treatment group and the control group before and after the training program.  In cases 6, 
14, 16, and 19, we also observed management scores between the classroom training 
and the on-site training (Survey 2).  Another round of surveys has been conducted very 
recently in one study site and is planned in the others.  
In our randomized experiments, we randomly invited a number of owners and 
managers to take part in a training program. It was up to them to decide whether or not 
to attend.  Since some did not, we estimated the local average treatment effects (LATE, 
Imbens and Agrist 1994).   The estimated LATE on the participants was positive and 
highly significant for the management score in all the randomized experiments that we 
conducted (cases 6, 10, 14, 16, and 19).  As mentioned earlier, the LATE on firm 
survival is also positive and significant in case 10, even though it could not be estimated 
in the other cases because the incidence of exit was negligibly low.  Since owners and 
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managers may not be fully aware of the value of management skills, it is interesting to 
examine how training affects the willingness to pay (WTP for management training. We 
asked our sample owners and managers about their willingness to pay about 400 US 
dollars before and after four of our experiments (cases 6, 14, 16 and 19).  In three cases, 
the WTP for the participants increased sizably after the training. In two of these three 
cases, the WTP also increased for non-participants in the control group.  These WTP 
results on suggest that many owners and managers were unaware of the value of 
training before taking part, and that the vast majority of training participants attach high 
value after taking part. In addition, some non-participants also become willing to pay, 
based solely on what they hear about the program.  
The LATEs on the participants’ accounting-based performance indicators, 
however, are not statistically significant in case 16.  This is most likely because the 
follow-up survey was conducted too soon, only two months after the on-site training 
was completed and five months after the classroom training.  In cases 6 and 14, a 
number of MSEs had not collected receivables from their customers in the short period 
before the follow-up survey, so accounting-based performance data are not available 
until the next round of survey.   
In case 10, where the follow-up survey was conducted a year after the classroom 
training program, the estimated LATE on annual value added is 13,890 US dollars and 
is marginally significant.  This indicates that participation in the classroom training for 
three weeks increased a participant firm’s value added by 13,890 dollars on average 
relative to the non-participant firms’ value added for the single year immediately after 
the training program.  The training effect may persist for several years, and the estimate 
of the effect may be diluted by the improved performance of non-participants due to 
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knowledge spillovers.  Thus, the estimated LATE of 13,890 dollars is likely to 
underestimate the social benefit of the training.  The cost of the training per participant 
is 740 dollars.  For the experiment in this study site, we did not hire international 
consultants, and the venue was provided by a nearby vocational school free of charge. 
The cost per participant in this study site was relatively low. It could have been even 
lower if the same training had been rolled out for a large number of participants because 
some costs, such as preparing teaching material are fixed.  
In case 19, the follow-up survey was conducted just three months after the on-site 
training had been completed.  Since almost all the invited owners and managers 
participated in the training in this site, we estimated the average treatment effect on the 
participants. It is estimated that the classroom training increased the annual value added 
of firms taking part by 4,181 US dollars. On-site training increased that by 4,038 dollars 
on average relative to non-participants.26  The classroom training cost per invited firm 
was 2,905 US dollars, which includes the fee for an international consultant from Japan 
and banquet hall rental paid to in one of the largest hotels in Dar es Salaam.  The on-site 
training cost per participating firm was 2,043 dollars, which again includes the fee for 
an international consultant from Japan.   Despite cost being over-estimated and benefits 
under-estimated, it is remarkable and encouraging that the estimated effect tends to 
exceed the cost 
 
Issues for Future Research 
It may be interesting to note that training effects depend on the education level of 
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 Note that the effect of the on-site training would be more difficult to be realized by the time of the 
follow-up survey because the on-site training was implemented after the classroom training. 
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the training participant, as our studies in Ghana and Ethiopia, Bjorvatn and Tungodden 
(2010), and some other studies attest.  For example, educated owners and managers tend 
to benefit more from training in record keeping practices probably because record 
keeping requires math skills.  According to Giné and Mansuri (2011), female training 
participants benefit less than male participants probably because females are faced with 
more severe constraints limiting their latitude in the adoption of new management 
practices and in the expansion of their businesses.  Berge et al. (2011) measure 
preference variables and argue that female owners and managers perform less well 
because they are more risk-averse and less willing to compete than their male 
counterparts.  In our sample of garment producers in Tanzania (case 19), female owners 
and managers comprise the majority, and many of them operate businesses not to make 
a living but to have disposable income that they can spend as they wish, according to 
our unstructured interviews with them.  Yet, we find no evidence for underperformance 
of female owners and managers in terms of business performance.  In terms of 
management skills, they were somewhat superior to their male counterparts, probably 
because many of them had started their businesses after receiving garment business 
training provided by some organizations exclusively for females.  In our experimental 
management training program, male owners and managers participated and benefited 
from the training a little more than female participants.  This could be a catch-up rather 
than the gender difference in the effect of training.   
More generally, there are those training participants who can apply new ideas to 
their businesses successfully, and those who cannot acquire useful knowledge.  Indeed 
different effects in terms of education have already been reported by several studies, 
including Mano et al. (2012).  To the extent that these different effects are more a rule 
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than exception, the cost-benefit analysis of the training would need to take them into 
account.  We will come back to this point shortly after the discussion of spillovers 
below.  
Knowledge spillovers are a vexing problem for researchers who want to estimate 
training effects, but they are socially beneficial.  To design better training programs, we 
should pay more attention and devote more efforts to explore what type of knowledge is 
easy or difficult to spread, what the major channels of spillovers are, and how fast and 
how accurately knowledge is conveyed through spillovers.  The data generated by our 
experiments in Ethiopia and Tanzania suggests that knowledge spills overs not only 
from participants to non-participants but also from participants to participants. Also, 
participants benefit from talking about the training contents to others.  In other words, 
you can better yourself by observing others and the best way to learn something is to 
teach it.   To the extent that these tentative results are robust, it is useful to increase 
opportunities for participants to discuss management and to visit each other’s firms, for 
example, by encouraging them to organize alumni associations. 
The methodology featuring randomized controlled trials and the estimation of the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) has been extensively used in medical 
studies of the effects of medicines.  Spillovers are not a major concern in such studies.  
By contrast, the effect of teaching knowledge and skills is likely to be accompanied by 
spillovers.  If management training generates considerable external effects, it may not 
necessarily be a good idea to estimate ATT or LATE in order to grasp the training 
impacts.  If training contents spill over widely, we should focus on analyzing what types 
of owners and managers assimilate training contents better and disseminate them to a 
greater number of others. If training contents do not spill over widely, but the success 
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story of participants spurs many others to actively try to acquire useful knowledge and 
skills, it is desirable to concentrate the limited training resources on nurturing promising 
owners and managers and developing success stories or role models.  In either case, it is 
meaningless to be obsessed by the idea of estimating the impact on average and to 
evaluate training programs through the estimated impact on average. 
 To design better training programs, what to teach and how to teach are critical 
issues to be explored.  These issues have not received due attention in existing studies of 
management training. A major exception is the study by Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar 
(2010), which compares different ways of teaching bookkeeping.  Traditionally, 
Japanese businessmen, business consultants, and aid workers are fond of teaching the 
Japanese style of production and quality management, Kaizen. Kaizen is “a 
commonsense, low-cost approach to management” according to Imai (1997).  It is now 
adopted by a number of large firms in the developed and emerging economies, often 
under the name of lean management.  Business development service (BDS) providers 
who received, say, the ILO’s entrepreneurship and business management training must 
have heard of Kaizen, but they do not allocate much time to it when they serve as 
instructors in training programs. However, in our experience of hiring them as 
instructors in our pilot projects, they are excellent at teaching entrepreneurship, business 
strategy, marketing, and record keeping. The tentative results of our training 
experiments indicate that training participants appreciate both Kaizen-type training and 
BDS-type training. Therefore we have designed our programs to include both. 
While the discussion in this section has focused on management training, we 
believe that training programs for MSE owners and managers in developing countries 
should include innovation as a major subject.  As we saw in the previous section, it is 
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vital for these owners and managers to succeed in product quality improvement, 
branding, improvements in marketing, strengthening relationships with suppliers, and 
improvements in management of labor, inventory, and finance.  Moreover, since a 
number of clusters in developed and emerging economies have achieved these 
multidimensional improvements in production and management, a number of them 
should be able to share their experiences with owners and managers in survival clusters 
in the developing world, especially in SSA.  Thus, These issues should be incorporated 
in management training programs to cultivate both the innovative and managerial 
capacities of owners and managers. 
If MSE owners and managers are likely to benefit from learning diverse subjects, 
should all subjects are to be taught in the same way.  Given the heterogeneity of owners 
and managers, the question arises also as to whether to include them all in the same 
class.  According to our tentative results classroom training and on-site training have 
similar effects in BDS-type training but differ in Kaizen-type training.  It is difficult for 
training participants to understand how to apply the knowledge of Kaizen without 
looking at concrete examples.  So for Kaizen on-site training and visiting other 
participants’ workshops seem to be more effective. Another related finding is that while 
the effect of on-site training on the adoption of Kaizen-type practices does not depend 
on the participant’s education level, the effect of classroom training on the adoption of 
BDS-type practices does.   These preliminary results warrant further studies on how to 
efficiently teach management to MSE owners and managers in developing countries. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
The pace of industrial development is largely determined by the dissemination 
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and adoption of new technologies and good management practices.  The market for 
management consulting and training services, however, is likely to fail.  This is partly 
because knowledge spillovers create a gap between the social and private benefits of 
acquiring managerial capacity, and partly because many owners and managers are not 
aware of the importance of management knowledge. In this paper we argue that to help 
MSEs in developing countries prosper management training should be supported by 
government and foreign aid.   In Taiwan, the Industrial Technology Research Institute 
has facilitated importing foreign technologies and disseminating them by means of 
adaptive research and training (Hong and Gee 1993).  In Sub-Saharan Africa, there have 
been no effective institutions in charge of adaptive research and training toward 
improvements in production and management.  
In Ethiopia, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi took the powerful initiative to 
establish the Kaizen Management Institute in collaboration with JICA recently.  It is 
hoped that this institute will serve as a model of foreign aid that attempts to foster 
entrepreneurship in developing countries.  In this institute, promising local, young, and 
staffs are trained by Japanese experts with a view to disseminating management skills 
adapted to the local context..  We expect such foreign aid programs to reach a high 
success rate in fostering entrepreneurship and boosting MSE development. 
Although this paper focuses on cultivating managerial and innovative capacities, 
financial development and infrastructure development are as important.  Management 
training can have an additional impact if it is linked with finance and infrastructure 
development.  High-performing firms require finances not only to invest in capital 
goods but also to move from their original industrial clusters to more spacious and 
better-equipped industrial zones.  If a training program is provided before offering low-
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interest credits, it is relatively easy to distinguish innovative, promising entrepreneurs. It 
is desirable to link management training programs with the provision of credit and space 
in the industrial zone. This way firms with improved managerial and innovative 
capacities and, hence, higher ability to repay loans, will be more likely to receive loans 
and relocate their production bases with expanded scale of operations.   
Much remains to be studied about the design of management training programs 
for owners and managers, public awareness campaigns, trainers’ training systems, 
trainers’ quality assurance systems, and the overall strategy of dissemination and 
adoption.  In this paper we argue, based on our case studies, that management training 
programs are likely to have significant impact. They should facilitate learning from the 
experience of multidimensional improvements in production and management to and 
cultivate innovative capacities.  Considerably many more empirical studies are 
warranted.   We would like to propose that each developing country build effective 
institutions that facilitate the dissemination and adoption of technologies in earnest by 
taking advantage of the progress of studies in this area. 
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Table 1. Origin of Development of Selected Industrial Clusters in Asia and Africa 
No. Location Main product  Origin of cluster development: initial firm type and initial 
product 
1 Bingo, Japan Working 
clothes 
Farm households (traditional Japanese working clothes) 
2 Hamamatsu, Japan Motorcycles Small- and medium-scale (woodwork, loom, musical 
instruments, general machinery) 
3 Taichung, Taiwan, 
China 
Machine tool Small- and medium-scale (simple machinery) 
4 Zhili, Zhejiang, 
China 
Baby clothes Farm households (silk products and hand-made 
merchandises) 
5 Wenzhou, Zhejiang, 
China 
Electrical 
fittings 
Farm households (repair parts for electrical fittings in SOE 
factories) 
6 Bac Ninh, Vietnam Rolled steel 
bars 
Farm households (agricultural implements ) 
7 Sargodha, Pakistan Electric 
fittings 
Small- and medium-scale (electrical fittings) 
8 Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Garment Taylors (tailored suits) 
9 Nairobi, Kenya Garment Taylors (tailored dresses) 
10 Kumasi, Ghana Metalwork Small- and medium-scale (car repair) 
11 Northern Taiwan, 
China 
Printed circuit 
board 
FDIs (printed circuit boards) 
12 Chongqing, China  Motorcycles Small- and medium-scale and FDIs (motorcycle) 
13 Three cities in  
Jiangsu, China 
Printed circuit 
board 
SOEs and TVREs (printed circuit boards) 
14 Hatay, Vietnam Knitwear Cooperative (knitwear for SOEs) 
15 Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Leather shoes Migrant artisans (leather shoes) 
16 Addis Ababa 
Ethiopia 
Metalwork Migrant artisans (metal work) 
17 Nairobi, Kenya Metalwork FDIs and SOEs (metalwork) 
18 Dhaka, Bangladesh Garment Training in Korea (garment) 
19 Dar Es Salaam, 
Tanzania 
Garment UNIDO training (garment) 
Notes:  FDIs, SOEs, and TVREs stand for foreign direct investments, state-owned enterprises, and 
township-village-run enterprises, respectively.   
Sources: Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, and 13 are from Sonobe and Otsuka (2006). Cases 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 
16, and 17 are from Sonobe and Otsuka (2011). Case 10 is from Iddrisu et al. (2012) and Mano et 
al. (2012). Cases 16 and 19 are from Sonobe, Suzuki, and Otsuka (2011). Case 18 is from 
Mottaleb and Sonobe (2012). 
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Table 2. Characteristics of the Selected Industrial Clusters in Asia and Africa 
No Cluster Year No. of final 
goods producing 
firms 
No. of 
workers per 
firm 
Education of 
entrepreneur 
(years) 
Export markets 
1 Working clothes, Japan 
1968 
1998 
200 
100 
na 
na 
10.6 
13.7 
Not exporting 
Not exporting  
2 Motorcycle, Japan 
1950s 
1965 
150 
3 
na 
na 
Na 
Na 
Not exporting 
Worldwide  
3 
Machine tools, Taiwan, 
China 
1998 100 70 13.0 Southeast Asia 
4 Baby clothes, China 1999 
5000 (incl. 
subcons) 
15 7.5 Russia 
5 Elec. fittings, China  2000 200 340 10.6 Not exporting 
6 Rolled steel, Vietnam 2006 133 22.1 6.7 Not exporting 
7 Elec. fittings, Pakistan 2008 1200 10.0 9.4 Not exporting 
8 Garment, Ethiopia 2007 7001 26.1 10.1 Not exporting 
9 Garment, Kenya 2002 640 4.8 8.6 
Neighboring 
countries 
10 Metalwork, Ghana 2005 5002 5.9 11.0 Not exporting 
11 PCB, Taiwan, China  2000 60 930 13.2 Worldwide 
12 Motorcycle, China  2001 50 900 15.1 Southeast Asia 
13 PCB, China  2003 200 107 12.1 Not exporting 
14 Knitwear, Vietnam 2007 160 12.0 7.9 East Europe 
15 Leather shoes, Ethiopia 2005 10003 10.1 9.2 Neighboring 
countries 
16 Metalwork, Ethiopia 2008 130 72.5 10.8 Not exporting 
17 Metalwork, Kenya 2006 150 7.2 11.0 Not exporting 
18 Garment, Bangladesh 2005 4100 1231 15.0 Worldwide 
19 Garment, Tanzania 2010 700 5.0 10.7 Neighboring 
countries 
Notes:  
1. About 30 firms were engaged in the factory production of ready-made garments, and the rest 
were tailors with own shops at which they directly contacted with consumers. 
2. This is a rough estimate of the number of metalwork firms.  In the same cluster, there were 
thousands of garages or car repairers.  
3. This number includes self-employed shoe makers who were sometimes employed by other 
shoemakers. 
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Table 3.  The Number of Jobs, Monthly Wages, and Sex and Schooling Compositions 
of Workers in Selected Industrial Clusters 
No.1 Cluster Year No. of manu-
facturing jobs 
(1000)  
Total 
no. of 
jobs 
(1000)2 
Monthly 
wage 
(US$)3 
% of 
women 
% of high 
school 
education 
and above 
6 Rolled steel, Vietnam 2010 3.3 n.a. 161 5 0 
7 Elec. fittings, Pakistan 2008 13.2 n.a. 105 10 18 
8 Garment, Ethiopia 2007 7.2 n.a. 36-454 59 175 
10 Metalwork, Ghana 2003 6.7 99.26 32 0 25 
14 Knitwear, Vietnam 2010 3.2 20-307 59 70 25 
15 Leather shoes, Ethiopia 2008 22.25 n.a. 35-534 23 158 
16 Metalwork, Ethiopia 2009 9.1 n.a. 63-884 9 448 
17 Metalwork, Kenya 2008 1.2 1.7 117-2089 0 43 
18 Garment, Bangladesh 2004 2,1009 n.a. 61-9711 40 50 
19 Garment, Tanzania 2010 0.6 n.a. 57 8312 11 
Notes:  
1. The numbers are the same as in Tables 1 and 2. 
2. Including related jobs in the cluster (e.g., car repairing in the metal work cluster). 
3. Converted to US dollars by the prevailing exchange rate. 
4. The lower number refers to female wage and the higher one to male wage. 
5. The number refers to 2009. 
6. Including 80 thousand jobs generated by about 8 thousand garages. 
7. Including more than 5,000 subcontractors in nearby villages. 
8. Including those who have completed vocational training. 
9. The lower number refers to casual worker wage and the higher one to regular worker wage. 
10. The data include the employment in the country as a whole including the Greater Dhaka 
and Chittagong. 
11. The lower number refers to casual worker wage and the higher one to regular worker wage. 
12. Proportion of female owners, not workers. 
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Figure 1.  Growth of the garment industry in Bangladesh 
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Figure 2. An illustration of development patterns of industrial clusters in terms of 
changing profitability and the number of firms 
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